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The characteristics of the epidemic 
in Ukraine and the reaction of the 
authorities
At present, in Ukraine there are three hotspots of 
COVID-19: in the Chernivtsi region bordering Ro-
mania (47 individuals diagnosed with the disease), 
in Kyiv and the Kyiv region (a total of 79 cases) 
and in the Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk regions 
in western Ukraine (49 cases). In 13 regions iso-
lated cases (1–9) have been recorded and in seven 
other regions no individuals have as yet been 
reported as being infected with the virus. The 
reason behind the low reported incidence rate is 
the low number of tests performed. Although no 
consolidated nationwide statistics are available, on 
23 March the Population Health Centre announced 
that a mere 850 tests had been performed. This 
figure should increase due to the number of tests 
performed by private and regional laboratories, 
but this number is insignificant (for comparison, 
by 26 March Poland had performed more than 
26,000 tests). On 23 March, Ukraine received 
250,000 rapid tests and 521 laboratory test kits 
from China. Further batches of tests are expected 
to arrive at the end of this week. 
Regardless of doubts concerning the efficiency 
of the rapid tests, it should be expected that the 
next couple of days will see a major acceleration in 
the speed of the diagnostic procedures performed 
to spot new cases of the disease. In Ukraine, one 
factor facilitating the spread of the virus is the 
belated and poorly thought out response of the 
authorities to curb the transmission of the virus 
(e.g. the closure of Kyiv’s metro system which 
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resulted in commuters crowding into buses). In 
addition, over the last two weeks a portion of 
Ukrainian economic migrants (no precise statistics 
are available) returned home, including from Italy 
and Spain. The available information suggests that 
not all of them were examined by a healthcare 
professional upon their arrival, and many failed 
to comply with obligatory self-isolation.
Surprised by how quickly the virus was spreading 
in Europe, the Ukrainian authorities launched de-
layed efforts to improve the current crisis manage-
ment system. Although Ukraine’s first case of the 
novel coronavirus infection had been recorded on 
3 March, the government adopted a plan involving 
fighting the spread of the virus as late as 11 March. 
The announced measures were connected with the 
need to procure medical equipment and personal 
protective equipment and to include these in the 
state’s strategic stockpile. In addition, the first 
preventive measures were introduced to tighten 
checks at border crossings. Nationwide coordi-
nation of these activities was entrusted to an 
anti-crisis team modelled on the State Commission 
for Technogenic and Environmental Safety and 
Emergency Situations. The commission includes 
members of government, regional governors and 
the CEOs of major state-controlled companies. On 
14 March, Ukraine’s president signed a decree on 
the enforcement of a resolution by the National 
Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC) 
regarding the launch of immediate actions to en-
sure national security in the context of the spread 
of the virus. Since then, the government’s activities 
in this field have been supervised by the president. 
The proposed solutions are being implemented 
in the form of recommendations issued by the 
NSDC and are then approved by the president. 
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has focused 
its activities on counter-intelligence and cyber 
security measures. On 25 March, the government 
declared a state of emergency across Ukraine (not 
of the highest level). It will remain in place until 
24 April and may be extended depending on the 
assessment of the epidemiological situation. In 
practice, this is tantamount to stepping up public 
order protection measures (including surveillance 
of individuals in quarantine), restrictions on the 
free movement of citizens (no public transport 
between cities, a maximum of 20 passengers in 
a vehicle within cities, and the metro systems in 
Kyiv, Dnipro and Kharkiv have been shut down), 
and public health and disease prevention services 
stepping up their disease control measures. The 
state of emergency enables the government to 
introduce further restrictions including a ban 
on citizens gathering in public places and rec-
ommendations for residents to avoid crowding 
in commercial facilities. The state of emergency 
does not allow for civil rights and freedoms to be 
curbed, for limits to be placed on the freedom of 
engaging in political activity, or for the state to 
take over private companies.
The crisis in the healthcare sector
The Ukrainian healthcare sector is largely unpre-
pared to face the pandemic. On 25 March, Ukraine 
had 6,202 hospital beds suited to the treatment 
of COVID-19 patients, with major differences in 
their availability recorded for specific regions (see 
Appendix). Ukraine’s surgeon general responsible 
for disease prevention announced that the country 
has a total of around 3,500 ventilators including 
350 in isolation wards (their technical condition 
is unknown). Although plans have been made to 
purchase more ventilators, due to tender proce-
dures their delivery time are likely to be extended. 
For more than two decades following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian healthcare 
sector remained largely unreformed. A compre-
hensive reform was launched as late as 2017 with 
the implementation of a package of reform laws. 
The first stage of the reform covered primary 
healthcare and for example envisaged the intro-
duction of the “money follows the patient” rule, 
the establishment of a special agency known as 
the Medical Procurement of Ukraine responsible 
Ukraine’s Ministry of Health is expe-
riencing ongoing competence and 
personnel disputes resulting in the 
failure to purchase necessary equip-
ment including that needed to fight 
COVID-19.
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for purchasing medical products at the central 
level, the appointment of general practitioners, 
the introduction of online appointment booking 
systems and electronic prescriptions. To date, 
secondary and tertiary healthcare has remained 
unreformed (this stage of the reform was planned 
to be launched in spring 2020). In addition, since 
the 2019 change of power in Ukraine, the Ministry 
of Health has been experiencing ongoing compe-
tence disputes, personal conflicts and suspicions 
of corruption, which – combined with the reform 
currently being implemented – is exacerbating the 
chaos in the healthcare sector. Recent days have 
seen the dismissal of the Minister of Health Ilya 
Yemets, who was only appointed on 4 March (he 
remains in office). In addition, information was 
leaked to the media suggesting a major conflict 
between Yemets and the director of Medical 
Procurement Arsen Zhumadilov. Zhumadilov, who 
was appointed in an open competition, accused 
the minister of demanding that a candidate in-
dicated by him should be appointed as deputy 
director. Moreover, according to Zhumadilov, the 
minister allegedly attempted to bribe him. The 
conflict resulted in the blocking of the launch of 
the central-level procedure to purchase medical 
equipment and supplies, including those that 
can be used to combat COVID-19. At present, 
local government bodies and entrepreneurs are 
involved in purchasing medical equipment, which 
results in lack of credible statistics regarding its 
number and availability.
The political factors hampering the 
effective fight against the pandemic
As a result of the political changes that happened 
in 2019, key offices in the state administration, 
excluding the Interior Ministry, were assumed by 
individuals with no political experience. As he be-
came Ukraine’s top politician, President Volodymyr 
Zelensky believed that these officials would ensure 
that corruption within the ruling elite would be 
eliminated. The government reshuffle performed 
in March 2020 proved that the president had 
revised his views to a certain degree. However, 
the new government headed by Denys Shmyhal 
can hardly be viewed as a cabinet made up of 
reliable and experienced professionals. Therefore, 
it should be assumed that during the period of 
the pandemic, which in itself is a unique test of 
the government’s efficiency and the effective-
ness of cooperation between ministries and local 
administration bodies, the Ukrainian authorities 
will make mistakes and the effectiveness of their 
activities will be limited. 
Frequently, decisions regarding the fight against 
COVID-19 taken at the central level are being sab-
otaged and ignored by specific regions. This is due 
to the fact that the most recent local elections in 
Ukraine were held back in 2015 and the authorities 
elected in 2019 have either had too little time to 
consolidate their power at the regional and county 
level or have ignored the need to do so. Not all 
of the regional government heads (the so-called 
governors) have been appointed by the present 
president – in some regions they have already 
been replaced twice. Another problem is posed 
by the need to appoint officials at the county level, 
where many posts are vacant and some continue 
to be filled by individuals appointed by the former 
president. In addition, the new regional authorities 
were not always able to find a common language 
with the local elite – both the business elite and 
e.g. mayors of major cities. One example is the 
Kharkiv region in eastern Ukraine, where actions 
carried out by the regional governor have been 
openly criticised by strong regional actors includ-
ing the mayor of Kharkiv Hennadiy Kernes and 
influential businessman Oleksandr Yaroslavsky. 
In the conflict which has been ongoing in this 
region, the president sided with businessmen 
and threatened to dismiss the governor should 
the latter fail to reach a compromise with Yaro-
slavsky. In the regions, real power is held not by 
politicians associated with President Zelensky’s 
political camp but by politicians associated with 
opposition parties (including European Solidarity 
led by former president Petro Poroshenko and 
Batkivshchyna led by Yulia Tymoshenko), as well as 
Decisions regarding the fight against 
the pandemic taken at the central 
level are being sabotaged and ig-
nored by specific regions.
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by businesspeople sceptical of the new authorities. 
This has already triggered conflicts and rivalry. 
Moreover, it suggests that Kyiv’s decisions will 
only be enforced to a small degree.
President Zelensky is attempting to consolidate 
his power in the regions by launching direct 
cooperation with big business and oligarchs. 
On 16 March, he held a meeting in his office 
with 15 businessmen (including Ihor Kolomoysky 
and Rinat Akhmetov). The president intended to 
raise non-public funds for the fight against the 
pandemic, to arrange for the additional import 
of medical equipment, tests and face masks, and 
to transfer a portion of the control of specific 
regions to the oligarchs. According to the very 
few press accounts of the meeting, each busi-
nessman was granted control of one or more 
regions depending on the location of his most 
important business assets. The information avail-
able suggests that the cooperation between the 
president and the businessmen has no official 
framework, which means that it is unclear wheth-
er the state will be expected to compensate them 
for the costs they will bear and, if so, how. The 
arrangements made with the oligarchs are proof 
of the state’s minor effectiveness in coping with 
the challenges posed by COVID-19. They also 
confirm the key role this group is playing in the 
Ukrainian system of power. In the coming years, 
this cooperation will reduce Ukraine’s prospects 
of de-oligarchisation. However, in the short term, 
its effects in the fight against the pandemic are 
likely to be positive. To date, the president has 
managed to raise additional funds and managers 
associated with local business tycoons joined 
the regional crisis management teams. It has 
also been reported that Yaroslavsky’s contacts 
with Jack Ma, the head of Alibaba Group, along 
with the funds offered by big business, made it 
possible to purchase medical equipment from 
China. The first batch of this equipment arrived 
in Ukraine on 21 March.
According to announcements by the so-called 
authorities of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s 
Republics (DPR and LPR), by the end of March 
no instances of the SARS-CoV-2 infection have 
been recorded there. However, no information 
on the tests performed is available (it was an-
nounced on 18 March that a mere four tests had 
been performed). The delayed introduction of 
quarantine for residents of these self-proclaimed 
republics and the introduced restrictions (reduced 
or banned traffic at crossing points on the so-
called demarcation line with Ukraine and the 
border with Russia) indicate that the threat is 
being downplayed. This results in the residents’ 
reduced discipline in complying with quarantine 
(bars and restaurants, shopping malls and open-
air markets are operating) and the absence of 
sufficient checks and protection of individuals 
crossing the demarcation line between Ukraine 
and the DPR/LPR. The increased incidence rate 
of swine flu and acute upper respiratory tract 
infection recorded in recent weeks raises doubts 
regarding the actual number of individuals infect-
ed with the novel coronavirus. It should be as-
sumed that in the territory of the two breakaway 
republics there have been SARS-CoV-2 infections, 
however, they have not been confirmed to date 
due to the irresponsible policy of the so-called 
authorities and the insufficient number of tests 
performed. The demographic structure of the 
occupied areas, which includes a large number of 
senior residents, increases the risk of an epidemic 
developing there. 
Outlook
It is difficult to clearly forecast the possible devel-
opment of the epidemic in Ukraine. However, it 
seems that it is likely to develop on a scale com-
parable to that recorded in Western Europe. The 
example of big EU countries demonstrates that, 
once the number of infections exceeds 100, the 
increase in the number of new cases diagnosed 
accelerates significantly. In Germany, the number 
of infections reported two weeks after this thresh-
old had been crossed was 4,600, three weeks 
on it was more than 22,000. The corresponding 
figures for Spain are 7,800 and 28,800, and for 
The president’s arrangements with 
the oligarchs are proof of Ukraine’s 
minor effectiveness in coping with 
the challenges posed by COVID-19.
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Italy – 5,900 and 22,000. Ukrainian hospitals 
are not prepared to take in such large numbers 
of infected patients and the expected qualita-
tive and quantitative change in their equipment 
base will not happen over the next two or three 
weeks. Other epidemics, e.g. of tuberculosis and 
measles, are another factor increasing the burden 
shouldered by the healthcare sector. This, in turn, 
may trigger an increased mortality rate among 
COVID-19 patients.
Yet another challenge is posed by the spread 
of fake news, which may provoke social unrest. 
Representatives of the SBU point to Russia as 
a state which is engaging major resources to carry 
out disinformation activities targeting Ukrainian 
society. The effectiveness of the government in 
Kyiv will depend on its capability to enforce the 
solutions it has introduced. The actions carried 
out to date have demonstrated that the state 
administration is unable to carry out all of its 
tasks. Another challenge is posed by the need to 
enforce discipline and discourage residents from 
ignoring the recommendations, e.g. the laws 
restricting freedom of movement.
It should be expected that the Ukrainian econo-
my will suffer very serious consequences of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. In recent months, Ukraine 
has seen a gradual economic decline caused for 
example by stepped up protectionist measures on 
the part of the US, the EU and the Middle Eastern 
states. These measures are affecting the Ukrainian 
metallurgical sector. In February the country’s 
GDP declined by 0.5%, the volume of industrial 
production has been shrinking since October 2019 
(including by 5.1% in January and by 1.5% in Feb-
ruary 2020). At present, optimistic forecasts for 
2020 spell a 5% decline in Ukraine’s GDP. Should 
the global pandemic last longer, it cannot be 
ruled out that Ukraine will be hit by a recession 
similar to the one that happened in 2009, when 
the country’s economy shrank by 14.7%. 
One method to mitigate the consequences of the 
crisis is to immediately adopt a new programme of 
cooperation with the International Monetary Fund. 
Although a preliminary agreement was reached in 
December 2019, Ukraine has failed to meet its two 
main conditions to be able to receive the first loan 
instalment. These conditions required Ukraine’s 
Verkhovna Rada to enact a law enabling the sale 
of farmland and a law to prevent the situation in 
which banks formerly been owned by oligarchs 
and nationalised in 2014–2016 could be returned 
to their former owners or that compensation could 
be paid by the state to these former owners. This 
particularly concerns PrivatBank, formerly owned 
by oligarchs Ihor Kolomoysky and Hennady Bohol-
yubov. Kolomoysky, who controls both one faction 
in the Verkhovna Rada and a group of MPs who 
are members of the ruling Servant of the People 
party, has successfully blocked the adoption of 
this law. The vote is planned to take place during 
an extraordinary parliamentary meeting. However, 
it is not known when this meeting will be held or 
whether the number of votes cast will be suffi-
cient to enable the adoption of the law. Previously, 
Prime Minister Shmyhal spoke clearly in favour of 
resuming cooperation with the IMF as soon as pos-
sible. On 26 March, Kristalina Georgieva, the IMF’s 
Managing Director, announced that if it meets the 
requirements, Ukraine can hope to receive support 
exceeding the US$ 5.5 billion agreed in December. 
Declining economic migration will be another 
problem for Ukraine. It is certain that this will 
happen, although at this point it is difficult to 
estimate on what scale. In 2019, Ukrainian eco-
nomic migrants sent around US$ 12 billion in 
remittances alone to Ukraine, which accounts 
for around 9% of the country’s GDP. Any decline 
in these remittances will not only affect millions 
of Ukrainian families, but will also pose a major 
problem for the state’s balance of payments and 
form another factor contributing to the weakening 
of the hryvnia.
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APPENDIX 
Chart 1. The situation in hospitals in specific regions (as on 25 March)
Source: Department of Regional Policy and Decentralisation at the Office of the President of Ukraine. 
Chart 2. Number of dedicated hospital beds in specific regions 
per 10,000 inhabitants (as on 25 March)
Source: Department of Regional Policy and Decentralisation at the Office of the President of Ukraine. 
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